To the utter dismay of many peace-loving people, an armed conflict flared between the Ethiopian, Eritrean and Amhara forces (henceforth 'allied forces') and the Tigray army in the early morning of November 3, 2020.
The purpose of this writing is to give an outline of the stages the war went through over the last eight months. The ten-day offensive by the Tigrayan army in June 2021 should be understood to be only a culmination of a build-up over a period that could somehow be delineated in stages. It is apparent that commanders of the Tigray army meticulously prepared a war game for the first six months to continuously hammer the enemy army to render it battle-fatigued and dispirited.
To give a bit of a background, both armies, from all indications, were doing all the necessary preparations to go to war or at least to defend themselves prior to November 2020. Hence, from the writer's point of view, the often-heard question as to who started the war on that fateful day of November is not instructive enough. It is more instructive to note that when the war started there was a heavy imbalance of powers. It is now clear that the size of the Tigray army (Special Force as it used to be called) was not a match for the allied forces, even though TDF generals were heard making claims that Tigray had a military capability to defend itself. From the recent interviews of army commanders, the Tigray army had been merely 9,000 strong on the day of the attack on the Northern Command. To understand the enormity of the imbalance, it helps to compare this against the 300,000 strong allied forces. In other words, the Tigray army confronted an army that was at least 30 times bigger its size. I do not think there have been many parallels in military history where examples of such imbalance exist.
Therefore, the most intriguing aspect of the war is how the Tigray army has grown meteorically in its strength and can defend itself and finally vanquish its enemy. The allied forces were numerically stronger and had total aerial domination, not to speak of the drone technology extensively used at the beginning of the war. Speaking of military drones, Dr. Mulugeta Gebre Hiwet (TPLF veteran and a scholar) and several field commanders of the Tigray army affirmed that drones were key- in decisively and speedily tipping the balance of power in favor of the allied forces.
The reasons for the victory of the Tigray army are not fathomable by light research. I would instead defer to expert probing, as trying to address it without the rigor it deserves could well undercut it as a topic. Instead, I dare to discuss the different phases the Tigrean resistance has passed through, a resistance that is eight months long (237 days to be exact) and for that reason characterized as 'short and intensive' by army spokespersons. We can, therefore, identify six different stages while admitting that there may be substantial overlaps among them.
I have tried to explain the war in stages despite the enormous difficulty of getting authentic information. The primary cause of this difficulty is that the Tigray war is highly under-reported, except for its diplomatic wrangling. The premature celebration of victory by the government and the public's appreciation of that constituted part of why the release of information is embarrassing to the government. The declaration of victory was unequivocal and made in a series of announcements by the PM, the Chief of Staff, and the retired-returnee generals. They all conveyed a consistent message to the broad public that the 'juntas' were decimated and left with no capacity to fight and that all chances of revival were sealed off. Hence, the Ethiopian government would be expected to block war related information from reaching the public.
The materials used to establish the stages in the war are drawn from disparate sources: the videos released from the warfront over the internet, interviews given by army generals, international news media, and my own interviewing of well-informed individuals.
Stage 1: Full Force Engagement
This stage lasted 25 days between November 3, 2020,and November 28, 2020. It covers the period between when the first shots were heard and the takeover of Mekele by the Ethiopian army. Following the night of the attack on the Northern Command, The allied forces poured in from at least seven directions in subsequent days: Dansha, Humera, Badme, Gerhusenay, Zalambasa, Raya, and Sekota. Armed mechanized regiments, warplanes, and drones, the allied forces launched a massive attack on the Tigray army. The Tigrayan army was overpowered numerically, and the onslaught from the drones (for which the Tigray army was unprepared) was unbearable. The military goal of the allied forces was to quash the resistance of Tigray within a specific timeline and to declare victory to the population and the international community. The name given to it was 'law enforcement campaign' and, time and again, was amplified by the Ethiopian media as being a mission to round up and apprehend 'criminal bands of the TPLF' and to bring them to justice.
Antithetical to the above, the leadership of the Tigray army seemed to have a different goal when putting up its defense. From observation of how the various initial battles panned out, the primary goal for the Tigrayans was to inflict as many human casualties as possible on the enemy with minimal cost to its force. To achieve that, they fought in small bands of few hundreds, or even tens. By taking positions on well-chosen strategic points, a band stretches itself over a large expanse of land and fire off ferociously until another band takes over as a substitute, fully stocked with ammunition. The first band steps back and moves further to take another position. The rounds of substitution continue as many times as it is expedient to do. In that process, enemy causalities pile up, while own causalities are at the barest minimum.
During this stage, elite contingents of the allied forces were substantially weakened. At the same time, fighters of the Tigray army, who were inexperienced up until that point, were made to fast acquire the art of fighting in practical terms. When the Tigray army put up a well-positioned full-force defense like in EdagaHamus, it was to delay the advancement of the enemy forces to Mekele, thereby allowing the political leadership to make preparations to evacuate. For some reason, the contingencies in the southern part of Tigray (mostly in Raya) held out very well and brought about enormous damage to the enemy army. Maybe the sparse use of drones and the terrain of the area helped in this regard. It seemed that the contingencies in Southern Tigray could have defended well up to the end had it not been for the retreat of the northern contingencies southwards. If left to fend further, this would have meant that the southern front gets exposed to a two-sided attack.
Stage 2: Dispersal and Survival
Once the allied forces entered Mekele, the defeat of the Tigray army was evident. The allied forces were in hot pursuit of the Tigreans, using the drone as a highly lethal machine. Heavy hardware that the Tigray army had earlier captured in the first week of November was destroyed either by drones or by the Tigray army itself while retreating. If the Ethiopian government sounded upbeat about victory during this time, it was for a good reason.
The Tigray army was not wiped out as a fighting force, looking back - only rendered unable to stage an organized defense against a gigantic enemy force. The defeat must have come as a surprise and by no means expected to happen so speedily. The novel military drones were so effective that the Tigray army was dispersed, made to be left with limited communication capacity for its army regiments. The soldiers of the allied forces were gleefully on hot pursuit of the Tigreans into the mountains, valleys, gorges, caves across the breadth of Tigray. In this regard, the expansion of roads over the years helped the allied forces quickly cover grounds and facilitate the pursuit.
Stage 2 was when many believed that the Tigrayan army was no more in a fighting form and could only carry on like ragtag bandits, if at all. In particular, war being almost unthinkable without the continuous supply of food, medicine, ammunition, fuel, spare parts, etc., the challenge of logistics heavily weighed down on the Tigrean fighters.
This period covered about 45 days in my reckoning, which means December 2020 and the first half of January. In this connection, one recalls that veteran TPLF leaders (Abay Tsehaye, Seyoum Mesfin, and Asmelash W Silasse) were executed, arguably on December 12, 2020.
Stage 3: Regrouping and Selected Attacks
The Tigray fighters regrouped themselves and started to form strong regiments under a loose chain of command around mid-December 2021. Trekking from village to village, mainly under cover of darkness, army commanders and party cadres moved around to re-establish communication and a chain of command.
This must have been a nightmare to accomplish. During this period, the army grew in size significantly, if not meteorically. New volunteers from areas where it was safe to escape started to stream in for military training.
Ambush attacks were carried out on military convoys moving from place to place, while isolated military posts were also convenient targets. Surprise attacks in central Tigray such as in Edaga Arby and Hawzien are examples in this regard. In brief, it is a stage where the Tigray army ascertained its existence as a fighting force, endowed with the ability to unleash limited attacks. This period lasted from mid-December to the end of January, for about a month and a half.
Stage 4: Defending from the Mountains
This stage embodies both limited attacks in the manner described under stage 3 and staging defenses against massive enemy onslaught in the mountains. On realizing that the rebels had survived and amassed a larger force than expected, the allied forces mobilized larger armies from Ethiopia and Eritrea. The allied forces unleashed a series of campaigns to stamp out the Tigrayan fighters from their strongholds in southwestern and central Tigray and parts of Eastern Tigray. At the same time, the Tigray army admitted a massive number of volunteers from all over Tigray and conducted continuous training of young people. As a result, the ranks of fighters swelled up. During this particular stage, atrocities by invading enemies committed on the population were at their most glaring, and the youth was left with no choice but to go to the mountains and fight. Besides, video clips of Tigrayan regiments marching into and from towns started to make the rounds on the internet; Sizable contingencies gathered in open areas and dancing to rousing live music in the style of the liberation struggle of the 1980s. At this stage, army generals were also seen giving pep talks to new army members.
This was when heavy defenses were put up against enemy forces trying to encroach and kill leaders and when some towns were retaken (to be evacuated shortly after occupation). However, briefly, there was also a tactical move to affirm existence and demoralize the enemy through a campaign named after the late Ambassador Seyoum Mesfin. This period is the most extended, spanning from mid-January to March.
Stage 5: Staging Counter-attack
This was the period when the numerical and hardware strength of the Tigray army was highly enhanced to a point where it started to unleash counter-offensives on frustrated military missions of the allied forces. From semi-liberated areas, the Tigray army started to launch counter-offensives by exploiting strategic errors of the enemy and using military intelligence as a critical ingredient to battle plans. At this stage, military communication equipment and logistical support to the fighting army are no more hindering factors than they used to be. Four well-organized zonal armies, led by illustrious commanders, were set up with the capacity to plan and execute operations with a high degree of autonomy—the period covered from April up to mid-May.
Stage 6: Offensive
This stage can be considered the culmination of the last five stages, and was supported by extensive planning and coordination. A few weeks before the earth-shaking operation (Operation Alula), three army commanders came on TV one after another to herald the inevitability of victory and boost the populace's morale. Since the Tigrayan army had augmented immensely by then, and sizeable captured armaments ready for deployment, it was clear that the offensive was to start in earnest and to be met with victory.
Operation Alula looked like two or more full-fledged operations would follow it, given the size and spread of enemy forces. However, as General Tsadikan disclosed to a Norwegian scholar called Tronvoll, enemy forces crumbled faster than expected. Only one military set of offensive sufficed to drive it out from Mekele and reinstate the government of Tigray. Moreover, the timing for this first and incidentally last offensive may have taken account of a couple of important and urgent factors: getting Tigrayan farmers to plow before it is too late and ending the population's plight. This period, including the design and preparation for the offensive, stretches from mid-May to June. It is to be recalled that part of May did not see much activity in the military sense and may have been spent on internal consultations, planning, training and retraining, and drills.
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