There are a few cardinal developments in Tigray that have baffled some of us over the last 8
months; honestly, at least two premises are shaken to the core, and one central military theory
compromised.
It is now clear that the Ethiopian and Eritrean forces are decisively routed from Tigray. Fast
backward; this was unthinkable seven months ago when the Tigray forces looked like they were on the
verge of annihilation. The sense of the loss of the Tigray Special Force was further reinforced
When the Ethiopian National Army early in January declared that senior TPLF leaders (mostly
veterans) were either apprehended or killed.
So, one wonders as to what went wrong for the combined armies of Ethiopia, Eritrea and the
Amhara militia. The overarching question remains how the Tigray army could manage to
contain and deal a decisive blow to the combined armies (also supported by UAE) despite the
latter’s numerical, hardware, and logistical advantages.
It is important to note also that it was not only a war of armies, but mass terror through extra-judicial killing, maiming, rape, man-made famine, displacement, and others means were used by the combined forces to demoralize the enemy and the population. I should admit I cannot handle this question adequately as it may require actual research. I, therefore, hark back to the alleged wrong premises or assumptions I started with. One is that we thought guerilla warfare is a thing of the past (the PM is also on record for saying that). In fact, many were pretty much sure that guerilla warfare could not be sustained in the 21 st century as the conducive environment for such type of warfare does no more exist: low density of roads and limited communication of the 20th century Ethiopia are examples in this regard. These facts remain authentic but could not prevent the Tigray forces from waging successful guerilla attacks. Maybe, the change of circumstances only made the Tigray force draw up fitting military strategy and tactics.
The other wrong assumption is that the present-day young are too averse to the grueling demands of armed struggle. We argued that this generation is accustomed to material life and has relatively ample choices in life which it would not be willing to trade for such a costly cause. I have come to realize that this is a tentative statement, only to be proved or disproved depending on circumstances. Given the flagrant atrocities and mass killings of the combined forces, life difficulties on the battlefield would only pale in comparison.
The other age-old military thinking is the theory of ‘war of attrition’. According to this, the army
fighting from a resource-rich base, both material and human, tends to emerge victoriously. For this to be true, however, there is a simple but important condition to be fulfilled, which is that all other factors should remain equal for the warring parties. Generally, the theory carries a significant weight in warfare as war drags on and resource differential starts to matter. In our situation, however, many other factors weighed in so critically that resource disparity has been largely neutralized.
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